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Teply: Excess Liability: Judicial Creation of Direct Action Against Liab

CASE COMMENTS
EXCESS LIABILITY: JUDICIAL CREATION OF DIRECT
ACTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURERS*
Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,
250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971)
In a prior suit, petitioner obtained an 89,000 dollar judgment for injuries
received in an automobile accident. The tortfeasor's liability insurer paid the
insured's policy limit of 25,000 dollars to the petitioner. Alleging the insurer's
refusal in bad faith to settle within the policy limits, petitioner sued the
insurer for the 64,000 dollar excess. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed
the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint on the ground that only the insured
had a cause of action for bad faith.: On certiorari, the Florida supreme court
reversed and HELD, insured's judgment creditor, as a third party beneficiary
of the insurance contract, may directly maintain an excess judgment suit
against a tortfeasor's insurer for its bad faith refusal to settle.2
Most jurisdictions, including Florida, have recognized that a cause of
action accrues to the insured for the insurer's wrongful refusal to accept a
settlement offer within the policy limits.3 Courts, however, have generally refused to allow such actions by the insured's judgment creditors. 4 Direct actions
have been allowed only when the policy contained an unusual provision 5 or
EDrrOR's NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted in the fall 1971 quarter.
1. 237 So. 2d 247 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
2. 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971).
3. E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1969); Brown
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963); American Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 617 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962). Some jurisdictions define the insurer's
obligation in terms of "good faith" to the insured in considering a settlement offer. Others
require the insurer to exercise "due care" and hold the insurer liable for a negligent rejection of a compromise. See J. APPLEMIAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAaCricE §§4711-13 (1962).
4. E.g., Chittick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D. Del. 1958);
Francis v. Newton, 75 Ga. App. 341, 43 S.E. 2d 282 (1947); Duncan v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941); Biasi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.J. Super. 155, 249
A.2d 18 (Super. Ct. 1969). See 14 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §51:23 (2d ed.
1965).
5. E.g., Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939);
Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938). The policy in Shaw
provided: "The insolvency or bankruptcy of Assured shall not release the Company from
any payment otherwise due hereunder, and if, because of such insolvency or bankruptcy,
an execution on a judgment against Assured is returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor
shall have a right of action against the Company to recover the amount of said judgment
to the same extent that Assured would have had if he had paid the judgment." Id. at 821,
184 So. at 855. The Shaw and Kleinschmit decisions apparently precipitated changes in
policy provisions by insurers to eliminate the language resulting in liability. The new
language terminated the right of the judgment creditor to bring a direct action against
the insurer for an excess judgment. See Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1959), aff'd, 122 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1960).
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the insured assigned his cause of action to the judgment creditor.6 Three
reasons have generally been stated in refusing direct actions: absence of privity
and a corresponding duty owed to third parties,7 absence of an intent to benefit third parties,8 and absence of damage to the judgment creditor.9
The insurer's duty to settle in good faith arises out of the contractual
relationship between insured and insurer. 10 In deciding whether to accept a
settlement offer, the insurer must consider both the insured's interest and its
own interest,"' because a judgment above the policy limit exposes the insured to personal liability.12 The Florida supreme court in Canal Insurance
Co. v. Sturgis held that a judgment creditor was a stranger to that relationship and therefore could not maintain an excess liability action against the
insurer.' 3
In Shingleton v. Bussey,14 however, the court construed automobile liability
insurance policies to be third party beneficiary contracts 5 and thus implicitly
removed any privity or duty objections to direct actions.16 Although Beta
7
Eta House Corp. v. Gregory1
weakened the remedial aspects of Bussey' s the
supreme court in Beta Eta extended the third party beneficiary rationale
to all forms of liability insurance and reaffirmed in dicta Bussey's implicit
effect on direct actions.' 9 The court stated: "The question of whether or not
6. E.g., McNulty v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 221 So. 2d 208, 210-11 (3d D.CA. Fla.
1969), afj'd, 229 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1969). Not all jurisdictions, however, have allowed the
assignability of the insured's cause of action for wrongful refusal to settle. See Lipsig,
Limitless Horizons of Limited Policies of Insurance, 20 ClEV. ST. L. Rav. 1, 7 (1971).
7. E.g., Seguros Tepsyec, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 176-78
(5th Cir. 1965). See also 18 Sw. L.J. 157, 160-62 (1964).
8. E.g., Biasi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.J. Super. 155, 159, 249 A.2d 18, 20-21 (Super.
Ct. 1969).
9. E.g., Browdy v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 610, 617, 289 N.Y. 711, 718-19
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
10. E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 620 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
Generally, an insurer has exclusive control of all questions of liability, settlement, and
defense. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 617 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962);
Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 850, 184 So. 852, 859 (1938).
12. E.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
13. 114 So. 2d 469 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959), aff'd, 122 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1960).
14. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
15. Id. at 716. The Florida Financial Responsibility Law requires, as a condition to
the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Florida, that the owner be able to respond
for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle. FLA. STAT. §324.011 (1969). This
law inures primarily to the benefit of injured third parties. Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114
So. 2d 469, 472 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (Wigginton, C. J., specially concurring).
16. See Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1971).
17. 237 So. 163 (Fla.1917).
18. Bussey held that the plaintiff in an automobile negligence action could join the
defendant's liability insurer in his suit for damages. Beta Eta, however, held that absent
extraordinary circumstances severance should be granted to the insurer. See 237 So. 2d at
166 (Boyd, J., dissenting). See also Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971), which
ostensibly resolved the conflict between Bussey and Beta Eta.
19. 287 So. 2d at 165. See generally Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial Creation of
Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. Rv. 146 (1969).
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the carrier exercised good faith in the settlement of a claim against the insured could also be determined by a separate trial after the determination of
the case on the merits."20

Unlike many jurisdictions,21 Florida courts have traditionally characterized excess judgment suits as contractual..2 2 This characterization facilitated
the application of the concepts developed in Bussey and Beta Eta to allow
23
direct actions by judgment creditors as third party beneficiaries.
The present decision apparently allows the judgment creditor the same
measure of damages as the insured: the difference between the insurance
policy limit and the judgment against the insured.2 4 Both courts and commentators have strongly criticized this damage measure.2 5 The measure is
viewed as unjustifiable under either tort or contract damage theories, 26 since
the judgment creditor is actually benefited, rather than harmed, by the insurer's refusal to settle.2 7 The court in the instant case did not offer an ex-

20. 237 So. 2d at 165.
21. Many jurisdictions regard an excess judgment suit as a tort action. See 14 G. CoucH,
supra note 4, §51:22. But cf. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1969).
"An insurer's failure to settle more closely resembles a wrong against property (the insured's pocketbook) than a tort of a purely personal nature. . . . A claim against an
insurer for refusal to settle cannot be fitted neatly into either tort or contract categories."
Id. at 484. See also Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1957).
22. See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615, 620 (1st D.C.A. Fla.

1962).
23. Direct actions by judgment creditors as third party beneficiaries had been previously
recognized in Atlantic City v. American Cas. Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D.N.J. 1966).
However, Biasi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.J. Super. 155, 160, 249 A.2d 18, 21 (Super. Ct. 1969),
rejected the Atlantic City case. In Atlantic City the plaintiff possessed a partial assignment
from the insured of its claim against the insurance carrier for an unreasonable refusal to
settle. Biasi regarded the discussion of the rights of the injured party to sue directly without
an assignment as dictum. Davis v. National Orange Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Va.
1968), also had allowed a direct action based upon two Virginia statutes. VA. CODE ANN.
§38.1-380 (Supp. 1970) and VA. CODE ANN. §55-22 (Supp. 1969). Davis, however, has been
criticized: "Without additional legislative action . . . it would not seem that Virginia law
permits injured persons to bring suit against an insurance company for failure to settle
within policy limits. Lawson & Kemper, 1967-1968 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 54 VA.
L. REv. 1627, 1638 (1968).
24. 250 So. 2d at 264.
25. See, e.g., Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv.
L. REV. 1136, 1176 (1954), and cases cited therein.
26. See C. MCCORMICK, LAw OF DAMAGES 560 (1935): "The primary aim in measuring
damages is compensation, and this contemplates that the damages for a tort should place
the injured person as nearly as possible in the condition he would have occupied if the
wrong had not occurred, and that the damages for breach of contract should place the
plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract had been fulfilled." See also 3 A.
CORBIN, CoNTRACrs §572A (1960): "The recovery by the injured party, suing as a third party
beneficiary, is strictly limited by the stated maximum (with costs and possibly an attorney's
fee), even though he can and does get a much larger judgment against the insured."
27. Biasi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.J. Super. 155, 249 A.2d 18 (Super. Ct. 1969). In
Biasi the court stated: "If Allstate had settled the case for less than the policy limits, for
example, for $7,500, because it felt that there was a potentiality of a judgment considerably
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planation of its damage measure; 28 commentators advocating direct actions
likewise have failed to offer an adequate rationale. 29 A satisfactory explanation of the court's damage measure, however, could be based upon subrogation.30 As a matter of policy, the law will subrogate the injured party to all
of the insured's rights against the insurer.3 1 This subrogation theory limits
the judgment creditor's recovery to instances when the insured is damaged.3 2
Subrogation, however, would also justify awarding the judgment creditor
other damages available to the insured, such as punitive damages33 and
attorney's fees.34
The instant decision accords with the well-settled public policy of encouraging compromise and settlement of controversies.3 5 The decision also
eliminates one of the principal disadvantages of assignment of excess judgment daims: if a judgment-proof insured refuses to assign his excess claim, the
injured party is effectively precluded from recovering. With the availability
of a direct action, the injured party's recovery is no longer dependent upon
the insured's financial standing or upon the injured party's ability to induce

in excess of its policy limits, plaintiff would be in a worse position than she presently is.
Instead [the plaintiff] has been paid $10,000 plus interest and court costs, and has a judgment against [the defendant] for whatever that judgment may yield in the future . . .
plaintiff cannot rationally claim to be aggrieved ... as she asserts." Id. at 159, 249 A.2d at
20. The only harm that the judgment creditor incurs is the expense and annoyance of trial.
Such harm, it is argued, could not justify a recovery with a measure equal to the excess
judgment. Keeton, supra note 25, at 1176 n.97.
28. The court merely stated, without amplification, that the judgment in excess of
the policy limits can be recovered in a direct action, 250 So. 2d at 264.
29. E.g., Lipsig, supra note 6, at 8-9.
30. Legal subrogation in effect is the substitution of one person in place of another
with reference to a lawful claim or right and takes place by operation of law. See generally
R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (1964).
31. E.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). Judicial
imposition of legal subrogation in excess liability suits, however, has been rejected. Chittick
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D. Del. 1958). Chittick, however,
characterized the excess claim as sounding in tort rather than contract; furthermore, Florida's
third party beneficiary concept of insurance and the public policy favoring settlement of
claims would seem to make Chittich distinguishable,.since subrogation can be imposed by
the law.
32. E.g., Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1971) (insured had no cause of action when his estate had no assets and therefore no
interest that could be damaged).
33. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1967).
34. See Virginia Sur. Co. v. Russ, 86 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1956). Some states also allow
the insured to recover damages for mental anguish caused by a wrongful refusal to settle.
See, e.g., Crisd v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 19 (1967). Under Florida's third party beneficiary concept there appears to be little
reason preventing the injured party to claim such an action in his own right. But see Keeton,
supra note 25, at 1176 n.97.
35. 250 So. 2d at 263-64. The settlement, nevertheless, must be entered into fairly and
in good faith by competent parties and cannot be procured by fraud or overreaching.
See, e.g., Florida E. Coast By.v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 111 So. 525 (1927). This limitation
may be an important influence in weighing the conduct and tactics of the injured party
to induce an unreasonable settlement.
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an assignment from a judgment-proof insured3 6 Direct actions by judgment
creditors, especially when the insured is impecunious, will encourage more
vigorous prosecution of excess judgment claims, since the creditors ultimately
benefit from excess recoveries.5 7
The instant decision, however, may allow injured parties to force insurers to settle claims involving questionable liability or speculative damages.
Allowing plaintiff's counsel to utilize the insurer's fear of an excess judgment
in an attempt to obtain larger settlements in these situations seems undesirable, since the insurance company has a legitimate interest in not settling
such claims.38 Direct actions, as in the case of assignments, may increase the
chances of collusion between the insured and the injured party impairing
settlement negotiations. 39 Such actions are also contrary to the traditional
policy of discouraging third parties from instigating litigation.40 It is questionable whether insurance rates will be adversely affected as a result of the
instant decision; the overall effect may even be an eventual decline in
insurance rates. 41
The California supreme court in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 4 2 advocated strict liability for the amount of any final judgment if the insurer has
refused an offer to settle within the policy limits.4 3 Four arguments in support of strict liability were stated in Crisci: (1) the standard is easy to apply
and it eliminates the necessity of determining whether the refusal was reasonable; (2) the possibility that the insurer will gamble with the insured's
money is eliminated when an offer is made close to the policy limits; (3) the
burden upon insurers will not necessarily be increased; and (4) elementary
justice requires that the insurer who would reap the benefits if a judgment is less than the settlement offer should also suffer the detriment if a
4
judgment is more than the settlement offer. '

36. Dye, Insurer's Liability for Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 38 TxAs L. REv. 233,
245 (1959).
37. Lawson & Kemper, supra note 23, at 1638. But see Comment, Liability of Insurer
for Failing to Compromise, 9 LoYoLA L. REv. 98, 103-04 (1959).
38. Lawson & Kemper, supra note 23, at 1638.
39. See Lipsig, supra note 6, at 7.
40. However, this policy has often been disregarded in excess judgment suits. See, e.g.,
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting a champerty
argument); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809
(Ct. App. 1967) (public policy).
41. In the case of meritorious claims, insurance rates already reflect the payment of
excess judgments to the insured or his assignee in many instances; payment of the policy
limits in these cases will avoid payment of the entire judgment and the cost of defending
the suit. The cost of claims involving questionable liability or speculative damages that
are paid as a result of an insurer's fear of an excess suit may be more than offset by savings
in investigation and litigation costs.
42. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). See also Note, Duty of a
Liability Insurer To Settle Within Policy Limits-The Problem of Excess Liability, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 557, 581 (1963).
43. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
44. Id.
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